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INTERNATIONAL

SOCIALIST STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80 signed to press 21 Jul 80 pp 3-14

[Article by V. Petrovskiy: "Disarmament--the Supreme Issue of World Policy"]

[Text] Given all the acuity of the international situation, created as a result of actions hostile to peace by American imperialism and its accomplices, the objective realities contain within themselves the real possibilities for counteracting Washington's aggressive strategy--not only to restore the parameters of relaxation to their proper place, but also to deepen relaxation. International relations persistently demand that we approach resolution of the acute problems of today with a consideration for the accumulated experience and the prospects of their further development.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum held on 23 June decided to convene the 26th CPSU Congress on 23 February 1980. The plenum's decree, "On the International Position and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union", deeply analyzes the present foreign political situation and the party's international activities, and it contains concrete constructive measures aimed at preserving and consolidating peace. As is noted in the document, in today's complex international situation the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet state are displaying truly Leninist patience, firmness, and adherence to principles, defending and implementing a course of peace, of security of the Soviet people, and of international security in general, yielding not to provocations and at the same time offering a repulse to imperialist claims.

Warsaw Pact member states, which convened on 14-16 May in Warsaw on the event of the 25th anniversary of its signing, focused the attention of European countries and all countries of the world on the responsibility for the future that every state bears today in connection with development of international events. "The future is being built today," states the Declaration they adopted, "and the life of nations tomorrow will depend on the sort of decisions states make on acute international problems today--all together and each separately." They made an appeal to exert all effort in order to preclude the possibility of a new war, and to erect an insurmountable dam before it.

There are real conditions for achieving a significant change in international relations, for eliminating centers of tension on the globe, and for transforming relaxation into a universal rule, any violation of which would be interpreted as an intolerable threat to the vital interests of mankind. "Relaxation of tension," notes the CPSU Central Committee Plenum decree cited above, "has dropped deep roots into modern international life, and there are real possibilities for preserving it as a dominant trend of world politics." Without a doubt the clear, future-oriented position of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, which is expressed in the Declaration of the Warsaw Conference of the PKK (Political Consultative Committee), in its Policy Statement containing a proposal for a summit conference, and in the CPSU Central Committee Plenum decree, plays the decisive role among such possibilities.

During the Soviet-West German summit conference held in Moscow on 30 June and 1 July 1980, L. I. Brezhnev presented a number of new ideas and proposals in behalf of the Soviet Union, aimed at reaching agreement on a large number of issues associated with consolidating peace and international security, halting the arms race, and achieving disarmament, to include issues pertaining to medium-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet side also spelled out a number of concrete ideas in connection with the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe with the goal of providing a new impetus to efforts at finding mutually acceptable solutions. New proposals submitted by socialist countries in the Vienna talks on 10 July 1980 established distinct and clear reference points for reaching agreement on treaties of the first stage, and they provide a dependable foundation from which to subsequently achieve broader agreement.

What sort of arguments could possibly be expressed against this realistic, weighted approach that defines the content of these proposals, in a situation where imperialist reaction is brandishing its weapons, in which it is not only maintaining "hot spots" but is also increasing their number and raising the explosive situation on different continents to a new level? These proposals are dictated by true responsibility for the state of the world, for the soundness and stability of relations between all states, both large and small, between countries having different socioeconomic systems.

The Warsaw Pact states quite resolutely opposed attempts at undermining relaxation of international tension. The Declaration they adopted stated that they were in favor of "not undertaking steps capable of making the situation more complex, of having all states unite their efforts with the goal of halting the growth in tension, and continuing the policy of relaxation and peaceful coexistence." The process of relaxation of international tension must spread to all regions of the world. There is no country that could not gain from this, and there is no nation that would not find the fruits of relaxation advantageous. There is no reasonable alternative to a policy of relaxation of tension, and there cannot be one.

While the 1970's became a time of consolidation of cooperation and friendship between states having different social systems, in the 1980's, the Declaration states, "we must not only preserve all positive things accumulated in the previous decade, but also multiply the fruits of relaxation, and broaden the struggle for peace, freedom, national independence, and social progress even more. This will be in keeping with the aspirations of all mankind."

I

Inspired by the high ideals of socialism, peace, security, and welfare of nations, the Warsaw Pact member states once again declared their resolve to fight even more actively for military relaxation, for cessation of the arms race, and for disarmament.

The all-embracing complex of measures to halt the arms race, formulated in the Declaration, is based on Lenin's premise that disarmament is an ideal of socialism, that it is fully in keeping with the tradition of fighting for disarmament, inherent to socialist diplomacy.

History's first socialist state raised the issue of universal and complete disarmament at the level of world policy from the very beginning of its existence. Soviet Russia raised the disarmament issue in its practical aspect at the very first international conference in which it participated--in Genoa. In April 1922, acting in response to direct orders from V. I. Lenin, the Soviet delegation submitted a plan for universal, fundamental reduction of arms. In a disarmament conference of six states (RFSFR, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Estonian SSR, Poland, Finland) held in Moscow in December 1922, the Soviet delegation submitted a plan of proportional arms reduction. In the opening statement to conference participants, the government of the RFSFR declared that Soviet Russia was the most energetic champion of disarmament.

In February 1928 the USSR submitted a draft convention on universal, complete, and immediate disarmament to the Preparatory Commission of the Conference for Disarmament. The leader of the Soviet delegation declared in this case: "We can treat it as totally indisputable that this is the first time in international relations that a proposal of complete and universal disarmament is being submitted, in concrete form moreover, to the League of Nations, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will always remain proud of the fact that it is irreversibly responsible for this initiative."*

Today, universal and total disarmament is a constitutional rule of the Soviet state. It is defined in the USSR Constitution adopted in 1977 as one of the most important directions of Soviet foreign policy.

* "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], Vol 11, Moscow, 1966, p 170.

Raising the problem of real assurance of peace and disarmament in their integration in the Warsaw Declaration, the socialist states at the same time understand that imperialist forces are not ready to pursue universal and total disarmament. Therefore, alien to a policy of "all or nothing", they feel it possible and even necessary to achieve gradual, constant implementation of partial measures, though on the condition that they would proceed in the direction of the final goal. It is in this same aspect that we should also interpret the integrated program of disarmament steps contained within a letter by A. A. Gromyko written to the UN Secretary-General on 11 April, calling for transformation of the 1980's--the second decade of disarmament--into a period of real disarmament.

II

Owing to the efforts of socialist countries and many other countries, we have been able to advance in some important directions of limiting the arms race, despite the persistent counteractions of imperialist circles and the military-industrial complexes of the West. Nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water have been prohibited. The Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation is in effect. States have agreed to refrain from placing mass annihilation weapons in near-earth orbit and on celestial bodies, on the seabeds, and on the ocean floor. Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons have been prohibited. A prohibition has been imposed upon military or any other hostile use of resources affecting the natural environment. A certain amount of forward motion has been achieved in limiting strategic arms.

The May conference of the PKK of the Warsaw Pact countries stated its support for achieving agreement in all disarmament negotiations presently underway and for resuming negotiations in those directions in which they had been broken off. Introduction of the SALT TWO treaty, ratification of which is being hindered by the American side, would have great significance in this aspect. Negotiations to limit medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe are necessary and possible.

The Soviet Union suggested holding negotiations to reduce, in comparison with the present level, the quantity of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in western regions of the USSR. Such negotiations would become possible if NATO were to repeal its decision to produce, and deploy in West Europe, new types of American nuclear missiles, or at least if it were to officially halt such efforts. The Soviet Union still maintains this position today.

However, in order to get such negotiations out of their present dead end, the USSR recently submitted new proposals--to begin discussion of the problem of medium-range weapons concurrently and in organic unity with the issue of American forward-based nuclear systems. Such discussion could begin prior to ratification of the SALT TWO treaty, with the understanding that any possible agreements on these issues should be implemented only after this treaty becomes effective.

The fastest possible successful conclusion of the following negotiations would be a major achievement for mankind: on total and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their reserves; nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states having no nuclear weapons on their territory, and nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states presently not deploying such weapons.

Negotiations on urgent measures for halting the arms race that are not presently the subject of negotiations must be started without further delays: on conclusion of a World Nonaggression Pact; cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and gradual reduction of their reserves until their complete elimination; prohibition of the creation of new forms and new systems of mass annihilation weapons; reduction of military budgets, mainly those of the larger powers.

There is extreme importance in a new initiative by the fraternal socialist states--that of examining, under UN sponsorship for example, the issue of limiting and reducing the level of military presence and military activities in the appropriate regions, be they in the Atlantic, Indian, or Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean Sea, or the Persian Gulf, in the interest of insuring dependable and unhindered use of the most important international marine lines of communication.

The Warsaw Pact states once again confirmed that there is no form of arms which they would not be prepared to limit or reduce on a reciprocal basis, and there are no problems, either global or regional, which they do not feel possible to resolve through political means.

One of the main directions toward disarmament is limitation and reduction of the nuclear arms race. The USSR bases itself on the premise that this is precisely where the states should concentrate their efforts with the goal of halting and then turning the arms race back. It is only by developing and adopting immediate steps in nuclear disarmament that we can reduce the threat posed to mankind by the enormous nuclear missile potentials accumulated in the world.

In February 1979 the Soviet Union and other socialist countries submitted concrete proposals to the Disarmament Committee on conducting negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race. The most important condition for success in such negotiations would be participation of all states possessing nuclear weapons, as well as a certain number of states not having such weapons. The object of the negotiations is spelled out rather clearly: cessation of the production of all forms of nuclear weapons, and gradual reduction of their reserves until their complete elimination is reached. In certain stages we could examine, for example, questions associated with halting qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, halting production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and gradually reducing and then eliminating the accumulated reserves of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The necessary surveillance measures should be

coordinated upon in this case as well. Achievement of agreement on this important problem would doubtlessly lead to the greater security of states.

The issue of halting the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament based on proposals of the socialist countries occupied one of the central places in sessions of the Disarmament Committee in 1980. The overwhelming majority of the states stated their support for the fastest possible consultation with the purpose of preparing for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Only a few countries displayed a negative approach, refusing to engage in immediate consultation.

The USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity are on their part confirming their insistence that efforts to implement measures aimed at halting production of nuclear weapons and gradually eliminating their reserves should be conducted quickly and without delay.

The USSR continues to support limitation of the most dangerous form of weapon--strategic arms. In June 1979 the top political leaders of the USSR and the USA signed the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT TWO) in Vienna. Signing of the treaty would have opened up new possibilities for effective quantitative and qualitative limitation of the nuclear missile arsenals, and it would have permitted us to begin subsequent negotiations, SALT THREE. As we know, obstacles arose on this path due to the actions of the Carter administration and influential American political circles favoring a position of continuation of the arms race.

Prohibition of all testing of nuclear weapons is a major issue, upon resolution of which cessation of the arms race depends in many ways; such prohibition would put an end to qualitative improvements in such weapons, and it would prevent creation of new forms of such weapons. This problem is the object of trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain in Geneva. The Soviet side took a number of constructive steps to hasten achievement of agreement. Agreement was reached concerning voluntary inspection, establishment of a moratorium on peaceful nuclear detonations, and on having the treaty go into effect even if only three out of the five nuclear powers--USSR, USA, Great Britain--initially adopt it. In this case, naturally, the force of the treaty would be limited to a certain time period, and after the other nuclear powers sign it, it would become permanent. However, artificial complications generated by the USA and England are the main reasons that negotiations that had started more than 2 years ago have still not reached a successful conclusion.

One of the most important tasks in the effort at halting the arms race is to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. This year is the tenth anniversary of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which was written on the initiative of the USSR and signed by more than 110 states. The international regime of nuclear nonproliferation evolved on its basis. However, a large number of states refused to sign this treaty, and some, such as the UAR and

Israel, emphatically oppose the overwhelming majority of states and continue to refuse to reject their policy of creating or acquiring nuclear weapons. This state of affairs cannot but place us on the alert, inasmuch as proliferation of nuclear weapons, and especially their appearance in the hands of racists and aggressors, would lead to escalation of tension in the corresponding regions of the world, and immeasurably intensify the nuclear danger to all mankind. The 34th Session of the General Assembly refocused attention on the threat posed by the nuclear arms of Israel and the U.S.R, condemning their plans in specially adopted resolutions.

Measures to reinforce the regime of nonproliferation do not at all place an obstacle before international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the contrary it is only in the presence of conditions that dependably block the use of such cooperation for the creation of nuclear weapons that we can actively expand such cooperation for the mutual benefit of all sides. This would also establish a reasonable framework and insure the appropriate guarantees for the implementation of peaceful nuclear programs, and for the provision of nuclear materials, equipment, technology, and nuclear material enrichment services to interested sides.

The issues of reinforcing the regime of nonproliferation acquire special urgency in connection with convocation of a second conference to examine the action of the treaty in August 1980. Its purpose is to produce effective measures to consolidate international cooperation in this area, and to create conditions that would permit developing countries to enjoy the benefits of peaceful use of atomic energy.

A proposal by the USSR to reinforce the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, submitted to the 33d Session of the General Assembly, has important significance to reinforcing the regime of nonproliferation. The proposal foresees drafting, in the language of international law, the guarantees of nonuse of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers against non-nuclear states, on the condition that the latter refrain from producing and acquiring such weapons or deploying them on their territory. Implementation of the Soviet initiative would mean greater certainty of the non-nuclear states in their security.

The Soviet Union supports nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states not having such weapons at the present time. It would be superfluous to point out that such a step would significantly reduce the geographic distribution of nuclear weapons. It is indicative that only countries that are allied militarily with the USA stated opposition to the resolution on this issue at the 33d Session of the General Assembly. About 100 countries voted for a corresponding Soviet resolution during the 34th Session. The states were asked to study the possibilities for signing an international agreement.

The USSR was and continues to be a consistent proponent of nonnuclear zones in different regions of the world. It views their creation as one

of the ways to reinforce the regime of nuclear nonproliferation, to reduce the threat of nuclear war, and to achieve regional military relaxation. Such zones must be truly free of nuclear weapons, and the corresponding treaties must not contain any loopholes permitting violation of their nonnuclear status. It was on the basis of its fundamental position that the USSR signed and ratified, in 1978, the Supplementary Protocol II to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty), which documents creation of the world's first non-nuclear zone, embracing most of the countries of Latin America.

III

The issue of prohibiting creation of new forms and systems of mass annihilation weapons is gaining important significance in the struggle to insure security and relaxation. Back in 1975 the USSR submitted the corresponding initiative. The 30th Session of the UN General Assembly supported it and recommended that the Disarmament Committee begin writing up the corresponding treaty.

The vital interests of mankind demand that the "wild passion" of so-called technological determinism, which could lead to creation of even more-menacing forms of weapons, be decisively bridled.

Considering that it is easier to write a preventive agreement on prohibition of particular arms prior to their creation than to prohibit them after their production is assimilated, the Soviet Union is in favor of signing an all-embracing agreement to prohibit new forms and systems of mass annihilation weapons, an agreement which would dependably block the way of such an arms race. At the same time, trying to encourage negotiations on this problem, the USSR proposed, in addition to continuing the efforts to prepare an all-embracing agreement, writing agreements on individual new forms of mass annihilation weapons in cases where this would be necessary. A treaty prohibiting radiological weapons could serve as an example of such an agreement. The draft of its basic elements was initially coordinated upon in bilateral Soviet-American negotiations, and in 1979 the draft was submitted to the Disarmament Committee. The time has now come to exert pressure upon the committee to complete its work on the treaty, and to have it present the treaty for adoption.

The threat of deploying neutron weapons is still with us. Moreover Washington's decision to begin building the "basic components" of such weapons so that their series production could be organized at the needed moment indicates that the USA has not made the necessary conclusions from the widespread protests of the world public and a large number of states.

The Soviet Union is firmly and consistently in favor of irreversible rejection of neutron weapons. A draft convention submitted by the USSR jointly with other socialist countries has been in the Disarmament Committee for over 2 years. Unfortunately another Soviet proposal addressed to the

United States--on mutual rejection of neutron weapons--has not enjoyed a positive response either.

The issue of prohibiting development, production, and accumulation of chemical weapons, and of annihilating their reserves is being examined both on a bilateral basis--in negotiations between the USSR and the USA, and in the Disarmament Committee. The Soviet Union continues to feel that the problem of surveillance must not be a stumbling block in the way of agreement. This problem could be solved successfully on the basis of national inspection resources supplemented by well-conceived international procedures.

A UN conference on prohibition or limitation of the use of concrete forms of conventional weapons that may be interpreted as excessively cruel or as having nonselective action was held in Geneva on 10-28 September 1979 (with the participation of representatives and observers from 82 states). Convocation itself of the conference was a major success to the Soviet Union, which has consistently argued that this issue should be resolved within the overall context of the disarmament problems, and not at forums devoted only to the issues of international law.

Feeling limitation of international trade and deliveries of conventional arms to be a pressing problem, the USSR began talks with the USA on this issue as well. In 1978 the negotiations entered their practical phase, but then they slowed down due to Washington's position. In Vienna, the leaders of the USSR and the USA agreed that representatives of both countries should meet without delay to discuss problems pertaining to the next round of negotiations. This meeting was held in July 1979 in Washington; the next meeting, however, scheduled for September of the same year, was postponed at the wish of the American side.

Let us look at another problem--transformation of a large number of regions on our planet into zones of peace. The events of recent years emphasized with special urgency, for example, the need for transforming the Indian Ocean into such a zone. The Soviet Union is a firm believer of this need. Washington adheres to the opposite conception. The USA clearly intends to transform the Indian Ocean into something liken to one of its "inland lakes". Events occurring around Iran and Afghanistan have demonstrated with special clarity the essence of the strategy of American imperialism in this region, a strategy which has received support from Beijing. As we know, Soviet-American negotiations to limit and subsequently reduce military activities in the Indian Ocean began in June 1977. In February 1977 the American side cut them off without any reason. Now everyone can see why this happened.

Implementation of a proposal submitted by the USSR to the UN in 1973 to reduce the military budgets of the permanent members of the UN Security Council by 10 percent and to use part of the saved assets as aid to developing countries would have been one way to promote universal and immediate cessation of military preparations. The 28th Session of the UN General Assembly voted in favor of this important measure. But its

implementation is still awaited. Responsibility for this is borne by those states which, taking cover behind excuses of "technical difficulties", refuse to reach practical agreement.

In order to avert stagnation in this area, the Soviet Union proposed that states possessing a high economic and military potential, including permanent members of the Security Council, reach agreement on the concrete amounts the military budgets are to be reduced, in percentages or in absolute terms of the same order. This reduction could have been started immediately, extending over a three-year period. Ten percent of the assets saved due to the reduction could have been used to increase aid to developing countries.

Unfortunately the 44th Session of the General Assembly did not take constructive action to implement the decisions of the 28th Session. The resolution it adopted cannot be viewed as a step forward. Moreover it even makes this decision weaker. It contains references to the problem of "standardized reporting" of military budgets, and this can only make us stray from effective solution of the problem. Moreover the resolution contains yet another complicating factor: the issue as to the measures for maintaining surveillance over the reduction of military budgets. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, statements as to the need for introducing some sort of surveillance can be interpreted as nothing other than camouflage covering up a reluctance to reduce military expenditures.

Considering the need for preserving, documenting, and developing the positive results in arms limitation, the Soviet Union attaches important significance to encouraging all states that are still not parties to the existing agreements on cessation of the arms race and on disarmament to become so.

IV

Implementation of political relaxation on the European continent by military relaxation occupies a special place among the priority tasks requiring swift and widespread solution. In Europe, where two of history's largest military-political alliances oppose one another, together with their large military forces and nuclear arsenals, any military conflict would carry the danger of transforming into a world thermonuclear war. But the European situation is also unique in that this region also possesses the greatest possibilities for improving the political climate, and for stimulating the positive processes that are developing here.

It is precisely in Europe that major acts of peace have been promoted in recent years, on a collective basis and on a bilateral order. Obstacles in the way of better relations between states with different social structures have been surmounted one after another. The logic behind the development of events in Europe dictates the next step--a shift to real disarmament, which is the material base of a dependable peace. This is

all the more important because all participants of the Helsinki talks assumed, in the Concluding Report, the responsibility of promoting relaxation and insuring, in the end, universal and total disarmament under strict and active international control.

In recent years the USSR and other socialist states proposed many initiatives aimed at reinforcing relaxation on the European continent. During a meeting of countries of the European Conference in Belgrade, the Soviet Union proposed a large number of constructive plans for securing positive changes in Europe. In particular it proposed conclusion of an agreement between members of the European Conference to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The USSR also appealed for agreement among the participants of the European Conference to refrain from being the first to use both nuclear and conventional arms. This initiative is in full correspondence with the spirit of Helsinki.

Implementation of other political and legal steps, documented by treaties, to reinforce the guarantees of the security of European states, once proposed by the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact, would also have had important significance. They would have included, for example, a pledge by the nuclear powers never to use nuclear weapons against any European states--irrespective of their participation or nonparticipation in military alliances--that do not possess such weapons and which do not permit foreign nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory.

We can also recall proposals by the Soviet Union on nonexpansion of military-political groupings opposing one another in Europe through the addition of new members. The urgency of this measure stems from the fact that certain NATO circles have been trying to spread the sphere of influence of the bloc in recent years by adding new states to it. Understandably implementation of such plans would mean destabilization of the evolved balance of military forces. If we are in fact really interested in the situation tomorrow, we must focus our effort not on expanding the military pacts but rather at creating real prerequisites for their disbandment, at reinforcing mutual trust.

It is precisely in this context that a proposal submitted by Warsaw Pact states on 14 May 1980 was directed: in a joint act of good will, agreement was to be reached that beginning on a certain prearranged date, not a single state and not a single group of states in Europe would increase the strength of its armed forces in the region specified by the Helsinki Concluding Report.

The Soviet Union supports the other Warsaw Pact countries in appealing for convocation of a conference on military relaxation and disarmament in Europe. Measures aimed at increasing trust among states in Europe, and other measures aimed at reducing the concentration and size of armed forces and arms on the continent could become its subject.

Practical preparation for the conference could begin in the immediate future in multilateral preparatory advisory meetings, during which issues such as the agenda and the content and order of the proceedings could be determined. In the opinion of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, attention should be concentrated in the first stage of the conference on measures of trust, having in mind examination of disarmament issues in the next stage. In the opinion of the Warsaw Pact countries, the suggested conference should be interpreted in organic unity with the results of the preceding meeting of representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in November 1980 in Madrid, since the work of these two conferences would be supplementary.

Adoption of real and far-reaching measures in disarmament, to include successful conclusion of negotiations in Vienna, now in their seventh year, on mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, would have decisive significance in reinforcing peace and security on the European continent. Reduction of the military potentials of the two groupings in Europe would be the principal direction of efforts by the states to achieve military relaxation on the continent.

But unfortunately the Vienna negotiations have still not produced any sort of realistic results. The problem lies here not only in objective, real difficulties associated with the complexity of the issues under examination. As many years of experience have shown, all such obstacles could be successfully surmounted if the participants of the negotiations equally display good will in their effort to reach agreement. But in contrast to the socialist countries, the NATO members are not displaying such an interest.

Recently the negotiations have become additionally complicated owing to increasing military preparations by countries of the North Atlantic Bloc and by their decision to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of a number of them. As was clearly demonstrated by proposals suggested by NATO in Vienna on 20 December 1979, the bloc is assuming a course of protracted negotiations and refusal to participate in effective and equal reductions of arms and armed forces in Central Europe.

It is typical that Western participants of the negotiations have strayed from their own proposals in regard to a number of issues (the refusal to reduce and limit nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the desire to completely exclude, from the process of reduction, the armed forces of the FRG, Great Britain, and other Western allies possessing more than three-fourths of the NATO personnel in Central Europe).

The USA and its allies stipulate that reduction of Soviet and American troops must be preceded in the first stage by achievement of preliminary agreement on their numbers, and by implementation, by the socialist countries, of an all-embracing system of so-called incidental measures aimed at establishing totally unjustified, strict surveillance over the

activities of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, not only in the region of reduction but also on the territory of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, as well as of Soviet forces over a significant part of the European USSR.

All of this permits the conclusion that the present position of the NATO countries offers no promise for reaching agreement. But the foundation for a mutually acceptable solution does exist. It can be found in proposals by the socialist states on 8 June 1978, 28 June 1979, and 10 July 1980, permeated with the spirit of compromise; these proposals reckon with the present position of the Western participants of the negotiations, and they meet them half-way. In addition a decision by the Soviet Union to unilaterally reduce the numbers of Soviet troops and arms in Central Europe, an effort which is now reaching its conclusion with removal of 20,000 servicemen and 1,000 tanks from the GDR, provided an additional forward thrust to the Vienna talks.

The Soviet Union and other socialist states are prepared to continue promoting progress in the negotiations, and they feel that it has long been time to transform them from fruitless debates into a truly effective, constructive discussion of the tasks at hand. Europe, which has endured two world military catastrophes, is not only duty-bound to seek effective security; it also can and must be the example of effective security. It is in a position to be a model for all the world in deepening trust, in true neighborliness of all states, large and small, irrespective of differences in their social systems.

V.

The Soviet Union consistently supports adoption of political and international legal guarantees of peace. Among them, complete exclusion of aggressive wars and establishment of responsibility in the eyes of international law for aggression and for other crimes against peace occupy an important place.

In today's conditions, in which imperialist reaction is increasing its efforts at neutralizing the positive results attained over many years and even decades, the problem of nonuse of force in international affairs acquires the most important significance. This principle received international legal recognition in a number of UN documents, such as the UN Charter, the resolution "On Nonuse of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" adopted in 1971 by the 27th Session of the General Assembly on the USSR's initiative, and the Concluding Document of the Special Disarmament Session of the UN General Assembly.

Today, development of stable relations between states on the basis of consolidation of peace and resolution of conflicts exclusively by peaceful means require that the principle of the nonuse of force in international relations become a universal, legally binding rule. A proposal to sign

a world treaty on the nonuse of force, formulated for the first time by L. I. Brezhnev in a report to the 25th CPSU Congress, has truly historical significance.

In opposition to the expressed will of the majority of the UN's members, who are in favor of a world treaty of nonuse of force, the USA attempted to disrupt the work of an April-May 1980 session of a special UN committee having the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the principle of nonuse of force in international relations, and it openly refused to participate in the meetings. However, these attempts were unsuccessful, and they were not supported by most members of the special committee. Its session demonstrated the growing interest of developing countries in strengthening the international legal foundations of the nonuse of force in international relations. Many delegations described the Soviet draft as a suitable basis for developing a universally acceptable text for the treaty.

The time has come to convene the World Disarmament Conference, an authoritative and representative international forum. As we know, the Soviet Union's proposal for convening this conference enjoyed the broadest support among members of the UN. And is not the cynical position occupied on this issue by the Washington-Beijing duo not a challenge to common sense and to the most vitally important interests of mankind?

The first special session of the General Assembly in the history of the UN devoted to disarmament was convened in 1978. It reflected the resolve of nations to put an end to the arms race, to turn events in the direction of disarmament, and in the end to reach universal and total disarmament. An extensive document organically containing many ideas proposed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was adopted at the session. In particular, it emphasized the need for convening the World Disarmament Conference as soon as possible.

* * *

In today's complicated international situation, it is extremely important to activate the efforts of all peace-loving forces aimed at reinforcing security, deepening relaxation, eliminating the threat of war, and implementing concrete measures to restrain the arms race and achieve disarmament.

A meeting of communist and workers parties of Europe held 28-29 April in Paris received a broad response from the international public. The documents it adopted are aimed at intensifying the struggle to protect mankind from nuclear disaster. "The struggle for disarmament is the priority issue today!" emphasizes an appeal by communists to European nations, entitled "For Peace and Disarmament", adopted at this meeting. The broadest strata of society and of the nations of Europe and the world adhere to this opinion.

The world's first socialist state--the Soviet Union--and countries of the socialist fraternity are consistently in the front line of the struggle to

bridle the arms race and to achieve the fastest possible transition to real disarmament. The basic position of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, which enjoyed clear reconfirmation in documents of the May PKK conference, is immovable: The socialist countries are prepared to limit and prohibit, on a mutual basis as agreed upon with other states, all forms of weapons, though naturally without detriment to the security of any one state, and in the conditions of full reciprocity.

The fraternal socialist countries oppose the policy of force, arms race, and hegemonism by their principled course toward relaxation, disarmament, and international security. The main thing is to defend and advance the cause of relaxation, and to guarantee relaxation in the 1980's. "Nor will we spare any effort in the future," emphasized L. I. Brezhnev in a report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 23 June, "to preserve relaxation and all of the good things the 1970's gave us, to achieve a turning point in disarmament, to support the right of nations to free and independent development, and to preserve and strengthen peace."

The socialist world is doing everything possible to hasten the day when nations would be able to live secure and work in peace without arms. Let future historians have the opportunity to call the 1980's a time of fundamental change in resolution of the supreme issue of world policy--disarmament!

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COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE STRESSED IN NIKOLAYEV ARTICLE

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 9, 1980 pp 86-97

[Article by P.I. Nikolayev: "Collectiveness as the Highest Principle of Party Leadership"]

[Text] Under the leadership of the Lenin Party our country's working people are successfully implementing the magnificent plans of communist building outlined in the CPSU Program and party congress decisions. They are creating the material-technical base of communism with their inspired and persistent labor and scoring new successes in the development of the economy and culture.

The Communist Party imparts an organized, planned and scientifically substantiated character to the Soviet people's entire activity. Relying on Marxist-Leninist theory and taking account of the regularities of social development and a wealth of practical experience, the CPSU formulates the general prospects of society's development and the correct political line and unites, coordinates and directs the work of the state and voluntary public organizations of the working people and all elements of the control system.

The Communist Party's strength lies in fidelity to Marxism-Leninism. Scientifically expressing the requirements of historical development, it is creatively applying and enriching this great revolutionary theory.

The Communist Party's strength and the guarantee of its successes lie in fidelity to Lenin's organizational principles, the creative activeness and initiative of all the party organizations and the high responsibility of each communist for the party's cause.

The Communist Party's strength lies in the close and inseparable connection with the masses. It has absorbed into its ranks the very best of the working class and the people.

The CPSU builds its entire activity on the basis of the principle of collectiveness.

Marxism-Leninism teaches and the historical experience of the CPSU and the experience of the fraternal communist parties shows that only on the basis of collective leadership is it possible to skillfully direct and develop the creative initiative of the communists and all the working people, correctly analyze the situation and objectively evaluate the results of work. The collective nature of the decisions and actions imparts great strength to party leadership and provides the party bodies and their leaders with a guarantee against a chance and one-sided approach. The principle of collectiveness is the highest principle of party leadership. The Marxist-Leninist proposition concerning the decisive role of the people's masses in the historical process constitutes its theoretical foundation. The leaders of the proletariat saw the working people's collective creativity as the decisive condition of the building of a new society.

Collectiveness ensues from the very essence of the Communist Party. In order to successfully exercise the role of political leader, organizer and educator of the working people the party has to build its work on the basis of genuinely democratic, collective foundations. The significance of collectiveness also lies in the fact that it insures correct political and organizational leadership and the party's development as the highest form of the social-political organization and the guiding and directing force of Soviet society.

A number of scientific works has been published in recent years which illustrate certain problems of the CPSU's development and implementation of the principle of the collective nature of leadership at the current stage.¹ This lecture examines the following questions:

1. Marxism-Leninism on collectiveness in the Communist Party's activity.
2. The CPSU's development and implementation of Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership.
3. The forms and methods of the exercise of collectiveness in the work of the party committees.

The principle of the collective nature of party leadership was first formulated by K. Marx and F. Engels. The Rules of the League of Communists which they had created in 1847 pointed out that leadership in all the League's organizations would be exercised not by individuals but by boards elected democratically. The highest legislative authority was the Congress, which assembled annually, and the highest executive authority was the Central Committee, which was accountable to the Congress. The Rules strictly regulated the periodicity of the work of the elective authorities and insured conditions for the development of the initiative and activeness of the League's members.² F. Engels wrote in the article "On the History of the League of Communists": "The organization itself was completely democratic, with elective committees which were replaceable at any time; this alone barred the path to any conspiratorial endeavors demanding dictatorship...."³

The principle of collectiveness was reflected even more extensively in the general Rules and in the practical activity of the International Workingmen's Association (the 1 International). It proceeded from the equality of all members of the organization and rejected the very idea that some part thereof could occupy a privileged position and another a subordinate one. The Rules provided for regular congresses, sessions of the General Council and meetings of the sections of the Association. The congress assembled, as a rule, once a year. In addition, conferences were held in which General Council members and section leaders participated. The congresses and conferences discussed the most important questions of the revolutionary activity and the cohesion and cooperation of the workers of different countries. The Rules emphasized the big role of the General Council, which acted as the international representation of the Association's various national organizations and local groups.⁴

V.I. Lenin creatively developed and enriched the theory of scientific communism. Relying on the teaching of K. Marx and F. Engels and taking account of the experience of the League of Communists and the International Workingmen's Association, under the new historical conditions he not only theoretically substantiated the significance of the collective nature of leadership in a revolutionary party but also formulated the concrete forms and methods of implementing this principle.

Back at the dawn of his revolutionary activity V.I. Lenin wrote: "It is impossible to wage a political struggle without the entire party having its say on all questions of policy and directing individual manifestations of the struggle. The organization of the revolutionary forces and their disciplined conduct and the development of revolutionary technique are impossible without a discussion of all these questions in a central body and without the collective formulation of certain forms and rules of conducting business..."⁵

V.I. Lenin's works and his entire practical activity were imbued with constant concern for implementation of the principle of collectiveness in party life. He believed that only collective leadership corresponded to the nature of the party and provided it with a guarantee against serious errors. V.I. Lenin wrote in the draft party Rules for the Second Russian Social Democratic Workers Party Congress: "The supreme party authority is the party congress.... All party organizations and all collegial party establishments decide matters by simple majority vote...."⁶

V.I. Lenin displayed constant concern for the enlistment of all communists in active and creative participation in the party's practical activity. "The Russian Social Democratic Workers Party," he wrote, "is organized democratically. This means that all party business is conducted, directly or through representatives, by all party members equally and without any exception; and all officials, moreover, all directing boards and all party establishments are elective, accountable and replaceable."⁷

V.I. Lenin valued highly in communists the ability to think independently and to make a politically conscious judgment about all party business and make their contribution to it. He severely censured all attempts to ignore the opinion of ordinary party members and to view them merely as the executants of the will of the executives and the boards. As V.I. Lenin saw it, each communist is an active, politically alert combatant. He is entirely responsible for the party, and the party is responsible for him. He constantly taught his cofighters, party cadres and communists this.

V.I. Lenin believed that an atmosphere conducive to a free exchange of opinions should exist in each leading party collective. No one should attempt to impose his views on other comrades by force or lord it over the collective. A board of leaders truly working as a team, he observed, can only take shape given the strict observance of comradely relations by all its members, respect for one another and the open discussion of all questions. Only on these conditions will the adopted decisions really reflect the collective experience and knowledge of the members of the leading party board.⁸

Party congresses and conferences and party Central Committee plenums were regularly convened during V.I. Lenin's lifetime. The Central Committee was a model of collective work and collective leadership. "It should be emphasized from the very outset to remove this misunderstanding or the other," Lenin said in the Report of the Russian Communist Party (Bol'sheviks) Central Committee to the ninth party congress, "that only the collegial decisions of the Central Committee adopted in the Orgburo or Politburo or at a Central Committee plenum, solely these questions have been implemented by the party Central Committee secretary. The Central Committee's work cannot proceed correctly in any other way."⁹

V.I. Lenin always watched to insure that the decrees of congresses and Central Committee plenums were executed unswervingly and that individual orders were not substituted for decisions of the collegial authorities. When it was necessary to express himself on questions whose solution came within the sphere of competence and duty of other authorities, Vladimir Il'ich emphasized on such occasions that this was his personal opinion as a party member and that the question had to be decided by the appropriate collegial authorities and by those within whose jurisdiction it fell.

In the "Letter to the Congress" V.I. Lenin expressed profound concern that the behavior of certain persons in the Central Committee might have acquired excessive significance for the fate of the party. To avert this he earnestly recommended that the Central Committee be enlarged with the best and most self-controlled representatives of the working class. He thereby endeavored to strengthen the Central Committee and enhance its authority and strengthen the unity of the party and protect it against a possible split.¹⁰

In his entire activity V.I. Lenin set an example of the strictest observance of the principle of collectiveness in leadership. Despite the boundless trust in him on the part of the party and people, he never permitted himself to individually decide questions for the collegial bodies of which he

was a member or leader. Before making a decision on the most important questions of the leadership of the party, the formulation of its policy and the determination of tasks and slogans, V.I. Lenin always consulted with his party comrades and exchanged opinions with the largest number of communists representing various organizations. An ability to rely on the masses and learn from their collective experience was a most characteristic feature of the personality and practical activity of the party leader.

"For Lenin the party of the revolutionary proletariat was everything, he was organically united with it, did not separate himself from it for an instant and could never counterpose himself to it and put himself above it," V.A. Karpinskiy, a cofighter of V.I. Lenin in the revolutionary struggle and a prominent figure of our party, recalled. "Lenin considered the collective nature of party leadership based on Marxist theory the highest principle of leadership insuring for the party complete success in the attainment of its goals."¹¹

Klara Tsetkin observed that V.I. Lenin had merged entirely with the masses and drew strength from them: "Lenin, powerful and bold, was the victor because he was imbued entirely with one thing: love for the creative masses, trust in them, a belief in the greatness and beauty of the cause to which he gave his whole life and a belief in the triumph thereof."¹²

A truly scientific approach to the problem of collectiveness presupposes the correct solution of the question of the authority of the leaders of the revolutionary workers movement. While recognizing the decisive role of the masses and the people in the development of society Marxism-Leninism does not deny the importance of leaders and guides of the working class. Although an outstanding personality cannot alter the course of history at his own discretion, he nevertheless plays a considerable part therein. He can by his actions accelerate the course of events and point out a less difficult path toward the goal or, on the contrary, slow down the movement ahead and make it more difficult. V.I. Lenin gave a profound and evocative description of the role of leaders in the revolutionary struggle in a speech in remembrance of Ya. M. Sverdlov: "For many decades the history of the Russian revolutionary movement has known a martyrology of people devoted to the revolutionary cause, but who did not have an opportunity to apply their revolutionary ideals in practice. And in this respect the proletarian revolution for the first time gave former lone workers and heroes of the revolutionary struggle real ground, a real base, a real atmosphere, a real audience and a real proletarian army where these leaders could manifest themselves."¹³

The personality may be energetic and strong-willed. If the ideals prompting the personality to action are progressive and if he acts together with the foremost social forces, the cause for which he is struggling will ultimately prevail, and the activity of the personality will acquire historic significance. And, the reverse. If the personality attempts to run counter to historical development and oppose the foremost social forces, he will inevitably suffer failure together with the reactionary forces on which he relied and whose interests he expressed.

The more magnificent the tasks confronting this class or the other, the greater the historical significance acquired by the actions of the personalities born of this class. The proletariat put forward its great leaders--K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. These are the brilliant theoreticians and organizers of the revolutionary movement. They are distinguished by boundless devotion to the cause of communism, unbending will and fearlessness in struggle, inseparable ties to the masses and personal modesty and straightforwardness.

Marxist-Leninists value highly the role of the leaders, generals, political figures and ideologists in society's historical development. The successful activity of the people's masses largely depends on how they are organized, by whom they are directed and who their leader is. "No class in history prevailed," V.I. Lenin wrote, "if it failed to put forward its own political leaders and its own foremost representatives capable of organizing the movement and leading it."¹⁴

V.I. Lenin resolutely opposed those who did not recognize the authority of the leaders. "Marxists cannot hold the conventional viewpoint of the radical intellectual with his allegedly revolutionary abstraction of 'no authorities'," he wrote. "No. The working class, which is waging a difficult and persistent struggle for complete liberation worldwide, needs authorities...."¹⁵

Following Lenin's path, our party is resolutely opposed to those who attempt to belittle the significance of leaders in the workers movement and counterpose the leaders to the masses, the class and the party. While noting the important role of outstanding personalities and leaders it at the same time resolutely opposes the exaltation of this leader or the other.

Loyal to Lenin's precepts, the CPSU displays constant concern to strengthen collective leadership in the center and locally and to organize the harmonious and precise operation of all the party's elective organs. The principle of party leadership," the Rules say, "is the collective nature of leadership, which is an indispensable condition of the party organizations' normal activity, the correct training of the personnel and the development of the activeness and initiative of the communists. The cult of personality and the violations of intraparty democracy connected therewith cannot be tolerated in the party and are incompatible with Lenin's principles of party life."¹⁶

An important part in the further strengthening of Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership was played by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee October (1964) Plenum, which resolutely condemned the attempts to substitute individual actions for collective decisions.¹⁷

A big contribution to the further creative development of the Marxist-Leninist principle of the collective nature of party leadership was made by the 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses. Documents stress the need to reinforce this principle in the center and locally and to implement it

unswervingly. "The scientific approach and collective and businesslike nature of the leadership of communist building and the pursuit of the Soviet state's domestic and foreign policy which have become established in the work style of the Central Committee," the decisions of the 23d CPSU Congress point out, "should henceforward form the basis of its entire activity."¹⁸

Important instructions on implementing the principle of collectiveness in party work are contained in the CPSU Central Committee decrees on organizational questions which have been adopted in recent years and in the reports and speeches of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and other figures of our party.

What is the essence of the collective nature of leadership?

Collectiveness in party work means that all fundamental questions of party life are decided in the party organizations and their executive bodies not individually but collegially, on the basis of joint discussion.

Practice shows that individually adopted decisions may bear the imprimature of one-sidedness and subjectivism. Any leader, however experienced and capable he may be and whatever knowledge he may possess, cannot substitute for the experience and creative initiative of the entire collective. The party figure and statesman, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasizes, "cannot consider himself the sole and indisputable authority in all spheres of human activity. Contemporary economics, politics and public life are so complex as to be within the competence only of a strong collective mind."¹⁹

The collective nature of leadership is, as it were, a combination of many opinions in a single opinion and of many talents in a single talent. Among people who have formulated a decision together there is increased responsibility for its implementation and for the general state of affairs. The CPSU Rules determine concrete organizational forms and regulations making it possible to implement the principle of collectiveness from top to bottom. They are most important norms of party life. In what is this expressed?

Primarily in the regular convening of party congresses. Being the highest organ of collective leadership and the expressor of the public opinion of all communists, the congress affords an opportunity for the in-depth and comprehensive discussion of urgent questions and the adoption of the most correct and authoritative decisions.

V.I. Lenin attached exceptional significance to insuring that congresses were held regularly, were prepared thoroughly and insured the formulation of correct party policy, strategy and tactics and armed it with a clear action program. "The protocols of the party congress," he wrote, "provide the sole picture of its kind of the actual state of affairs in our party which is irreplaceable in precision, amplitude, comprehensiveness, richness and authenticity, a picture of views, sentiments and plans...."²⁰ V.I. Lenin regarded the congress as an indisputable authority and considered it the party's most responsible assembly.

"All his life, to the very end," N.K. Krupskaya wrote in her reminiscences about V.I. Lenin, "he attached exceptional importance to the party congresses: he believed that the party congress was the highest instance and that everything personal should be rejected, nothing should be glossed over and everything said openly at the congress!"²¹

At the time of preparation for congresses V.I. Lenin attached particular significance to the collation and dissemination of the experience of practical work of the local party organizations and the consideration and use of the party's collective view. It is necessary, he stressed, to bring to the congress the thoroughly considered practical experience of economic building digested attentively and by the common labor and common efforts of all party members. Taking account of practical experience in order to reject that which is harmful, unite everything of value and precisely determine a number of the most important practical measures and implement them come what may²²—this is how V.I. Lenin conceived of the tasks of the party congress. Despite the difficult conditions of the underground, revolution and the civil war, in Lenin's lifetime the party held 12 congresses and 13 party conferences in 26 years.

The CPSU is firmly following this Leninist tradition. It sums up the results of what has been done, collates the experience and practice of communist building and outlines the new tasks and the ways to accomplish them at its congresses. In accordance with the concrete historical conditions and with regard for the experience of the revolutionary struggle, the party congresses enrich and develop Marxist-Leninist theory. The decisions they adopt are an expression of the CPSU's collective work and will and are obligatory for all party organizations and every communist.

The 25th CPSU Congress played a tremendous part in the life of the party and the country. It was one of the most representative in our party's history in composition. Almost 5,000 delegates who at that time represented 15,694,000 communists were elected to the congress. Some 103 delegations of communist, workers and national democratic parties attended as guests.²³

The CPSU Central Committee Report delivered by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee, and other documents of the congress contain important generalizations and conclusions on urgent problems of contemporary world development and the revolutionary process and the party's domestic and foreign policy. They comprehensively analyze the results of the Soviet people's creative work, examine the key problems of the development of the country's economy and culture at the current stage and determine the main directions of the CPSU's activity in the leadership of communist building.

The congress convincingly demonstrated the indestructible unity of the ranks of the Lenin Party and its inseparable connection with the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia and with the entire multinational Soviet people. The high evaluation of the activity of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo headed by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev expresses the

feelings of all Soviet people, who see the Communist Party's domestic and foreign policy as the embodiment of their vital interests and cherished aspirations.

The 25th CPSU Congress was a model of genuine collectiveness and high professionalism in work and a splendid school for executive personnel and all communists. Its decisions armed the party and the entire Soviet people with a clear perspective of the struggle and unshakable confidence in the triumph of Lenin's cause and the victory of communism.

CPSU congresses are of tremendous international significance. They always attract the attention of the fraternal communist and workers parties and all the world's progressive people.

The representatives of the communist, workers and national democratic and socialist parties emphasized in their speeches at the 25th CPSU Congress the great impact of CPSU congresses on the world revolutionary process and the development of the peoples' national liberation struggle against colonial oppression and for the cohesion of the world communist movement.²⁴ Comrade Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee and prime minister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, spoke movingly and evocatively on this score: "The communists of your country were the first victorious detachment of the international working class and the creators of the first socialist state in man's history. For this reason CPSU congresses since the time of Lenin through the present day have represented a very rich source of experience from which all revolutionaries of the world are learning."²⁵

The 26th CPSU Congress, which will be held in February 1981, will be an event of tremendous historical importance in the life of the party and the people. Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said in his report at the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum: "Every congress has revealed new horizons to our party and country. I am sure that the upcoming congress also, which is called on to determine the strategy and tactics of the struggle for the approaching stage of communist building, will do the same."²⁶

In the period between congresses the party's highest executive authority is its Central Committee. V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized the special role of the Central Committee in the life of the entire party. "Not one important political or organizational question," he wrote in the work "Detakaya bolezn' 'levizny' y kommunizme" [Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder], "is decided in a single state establishment in our republic without the instructions of the party Central Committee."²⁷ If the party lacks a single executive authority such as is the Central Committee, V.I. Lenin explained, it cannot achieve the victory of the proletarian revolution and defend its gains and successfully exercise leadership of the country. The party only performs its guiding and directing role "if its party center is a strong authoritative body with wide-ranging powers enjoying the universal trust of the party members."²⁸

The CPSU is firmly abiding by these instructions of Lenin. The role of the CPSU Central Committee is exceptionally great and multifaceted. Guided by the Program and congress decisions, the Central Committee formulates all the most important issues of party life and domestic and foreign policy. It is the party's combat headquarters and its ideological-political and organizational center.

The most authoritative communists engaged in various sectors of party, state and other public work and in industry, agriculture and in the sphere of science and culture are represented in the CPSU Central Committee. The Central Committee is being enlarged systematically. This is connected with the increased scale of the party's tasks. Thus the Eighth Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress (1919) elected 27 Central Committee members and candidates. A Central Committee of 87 persons was elected at the 13th party congress (1924). The 18th All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1939) elected a Central Committee of 139 persons and the 19th CPSU Congress (1952) one of 235 persons. The 25th party congress elected a CPSU Central Committee of 426 persons, including 287 Central Committee members and 129 candidates.

The tremendous political experience and collective wisdom of the Central Committee, which relies on Marxist-Leninist theory, insure the monolithic unity and close cohesion of the party ranks and the successful accomplishment of the tasks of communist building. Exercising single centralized leadership of the party's entire activity, the CPSU Central Committee displays constant concern to enhance the role of the local party organizations in the solution of the problems of economic and cultural building and to develop their creative activeness and initiative. The Central Committee is firmly linked with the local organizations, constantly takes account of their experience and opinions and consults them on the most important intraparty questions.

CPSU Central Committee plenums are of great significance in the life of the party. It is a law of the party and a rule of its internal life that they be held regularly. The Central Committee plenums collectively discuss and decide the most important questions of the leadership of communist building, intraparty life, ideological work and foreign policy activity. The measures they have formulated in recent years on the further development of industry and agriculture and an improvement in the management of the economy and culture have been received with great satisfaction by the party and the entire Soviet people. The style and methods of party and state leadership are being perfected and organizing and political work in the masses is being intensified under the influence of the decisions of CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat are truly collective party bodies. They regularly examine the most important questions of the party's domestic and foreign policy. There were 215 sessions of the Politburo and 295 of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee in the period between the 24th and 25 congresses alone.²⁷ "The decisions of the Central Committee and its Politburo and Secretariat adopted as the result of thorough collective discussion," the documents of the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized, "provided the party organizations with a precise reference point and clear directives, which contributed to an improvement in their work."²⁸

All-union party conferences are of importance in the exercise of collective leadership. They may be convened by the Central Committee in the period between congresses to discuss urgent questions of party policy.

The consistent implementation of Lenin's principle of collectiveness in the activity of the party organizations is insured by regular union republic Communist Party conferences, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon party conferences, party committee plenums and meetings of communists.

The party organizations' executive bodies are formed on the basis of intra-party democracy and by way of elections. This insures the election to them of the best prepared, politically tempered, authoritative people with a diversity of erudition and practical experience and who are competent in various spheres of the economy, culture and science and party, state and public work. Over 350,000 communists were elected to party committees at the party conferences held in 1978-1979, for example. They include 132,000 workers and kolkhoz members, 68,000 business managers and specialists and over 28,000 workers of science and culture.

The party committees are the embodiment of the communists' collective views and will and of their political and organizational experience. Their activity, as observed at the 25th CPSU Congress, is becoming increasingly fruitful and meaningful with every successive year. They are entrusted with the main responsibility for the implementation of party policy locally.³¹ Correct, competent leadership of the party committees and the scientific substantiation of the decisions they adopt are only achieved given well-organized collective work. For this reason it is important that the party committee plenums and bureau meetings discuss questions of party work at their sessions collegially.

But there is more to it than just this. Regular plenums and bureau meetings do not in themselves signify genuine collectiveness. The CPSU strives to insure that the party organizations provide for the joint discussion and solution of urgent fundamental questions in practice and that the wealth of practical experience of the party masses always be considered and put to good use here.

Upon the scientific development of problems connected with the study and propaganda of the CPSU's experience in the development of Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership it is important to bear the following fact in mind: the party's successful development is impossible without a collective approach in the solution of questions. As in previous years also, the CPSU can only perform its leading role today on the basis of collectively formulated policy and collegial leadership, a scientific approach to matters, the comprehensive, correct consideration of the experience, opinions and will of the masses and the development of the activeness and initiative of all communists. A particular role is performed here by the personal responsibility of each party member for the implementation of the collective decisions.

Communists adopt an exacting approach to the election of the executive party authorities. They proceed here not from formal-official signs but pay attention primarily to people's political and professional qualities. Some 189 persons have been elected to the Moscow Obkom. They include foremost workers and kolkhoz members, leaders of industrial enterprises, construction organizations and kolkhozes and sovkhozes, party and soviet workers and representatives of cultural, public educational and health service establishments. Obkom members participate actively in the committee's activity and the formulation of its decisions and perform organizing and political work in the collectives. All this allows them to display initiative, express their opinion and submit proposals. The skillful and correct use of the experience and knowledge of the committee members enables the obkom to adopt the correct decisions and exercise skilled leadership of economic and cultural building.

The role of party committee plenums has increased considerably in recent years. They are distinguished by businesslike efficiency and a frank exchange of opinions and serve as a platform for the development of criticism and self-criticism. Fundamental questions of the development of production, the increased efficiency and quality of work, people's education, organizing and ideological work and of intraparty life are on the agenda of the plenums of many party committees.

The practice of the preparation and holding of the plenums is being perfected. It has become the rule in many party organizations to send committee members the necessary material, including the heads of an address, information and draft decrees, ahead of time. Special groups or teams of party committee members are set up for the more in-depth study of the questions on the agenda of the plenums. These also include specialists of the corresponding sector, party machinery workers and other competent communists. This enables the party committee to thoroughly investigate the state of affairs locally, analyze the evolved practice of work, uncover shortcomings and adopt the correct decision.

Party committee briefings on their activity directly in the primary party organizations are important. They are increasingly becoming the rule and norm of intraparty life. In 1979-1980, for example, Leningrad's Kirovskiy Raykom briefed the communists on its work in more than 100 primary party organizations. Over 1,000 communists participated in the discussion of the reports delivered by raykom bureau members. They analyzed the experience of the primary organizations of their collectives in their speeches and expressed proposals for an improvement in the activity of the rayon's enterprises and establishments. There was a high-minded discussion of the work style of the raykom and city and rayon establishments. These meetings enabled the raykom to get to know the mood of the masses and the collectives' requirements better, ascertain the "bottlenecks" in work and outline a plan of action. The results of the discussion were collated and examined at a raykom plenum.

In insuring collective leadership there is great significance in the smooth functioning of the party committee bureau, which, being the party organization's executive authority, insures the fulfillment of its decisions and performs all routine work. Experience shows that the majority of party committees in the country is operating concertedly and smoothly. Bureau sessions are held twice a month, as a rule. The sessions' agenda is drawn up in advance, in accordance with the work plan. The members of the party committee bureaus familiarize themselves personally with the state of affairs in the sectors whose work is up for discussion. This then affords them the opportunity to get to know the situation better, express a knowledgeable viewpoint, submit concrete proposals and adopt substantiated decisions.

Well-conceived work plans are a condition of the party committee bureau's effective activity. Their compilation has become the standard practice of all party committees. In recent years the majority of them has also formulated forward plans, which determine the subject-matter and dates of the plenums, aktiv meetings, bureau sessions and seminars and outline questions for study, checks on the fulfillment of decisions and so forth. This makes it possible to perform work in a planned manner, avoid "routine business" and enlist all its members in vital activity. At the same time instances are still encountered of certain party committees spending much time on the preparation and holding of various sessions and conferences, collecting information, drawing up resolutions and so forth. Questions which could be decided on a current basis by business organizations are frequently submitted for discussion to the bureau.

A collegial approach is needed in order to outline in unison the correct measures for the accomplishment of this political or economic task or the other. An excessive enthusiasm for discussions, however, hinders practical work and leaves no time for organizing the fulfillment of adopted decisions. V.I. Lenin pointed out: "A collegial approach is essential for settling the affairs of the worker-peasant state. But any exaggeration of the collegial approach and any distortion of it leading to red tape and lack of responsibility and any conversion of collegial establishments into a talking-shop is the greatest evil, and this evil must be done away with at all costs...."³²

Collectiveness is not a form but the essence of party work methods. Every leader is called on to cultivate within himself a profound inner need to combine the experience of many people and be convinced that only the collective opinion affords an opportunity for solving questions correctly.

The party meetings have a tremendous role in implementation of the principle of collectiveness. A common opinion evolves and a decision is adopted which expresses the will of the entire party organization in the course of joint discussion of this question or the other. Here the party members mature ideologically, broaden their outlook and grow accustomed to discipline and organization. A carefully prepared and well conducted party meeting is a splendid school of communists' training and ideological tempering.

The collective nature of leadership does not exclude but, on the contrary, presupposes workers' personal responsibility for their entrusted assignment. V.I. Lenin pointed out that individual responsibility and individual competence are essential together with collectiveness: "On any occasion and under all circumstances without exception a collegial approach must be accompanied by the most clear-cut determination of the personal responsibility of each person for a precisely determined assignment. A lack of responsibility concealed behind references to collegiality is the most dangerous evil...."³³

A demarcation of duties among their members exists in all elective bodies. For this reason it is very important that each person perform his entrusted assignment in good time and conscientiously. Failing this, all work of a collective is inconceivable. Of course, the allocation of duties does not relieve this bureau or party committee member or other of responsibility for the activity of the entire party organization. Every committee member is called on to give thought to and display concern for the work of the party organization as a whole. The successes of the collective and the authority of the party organization depend on his conscientious performance of his duties.

The CPSU abides by Lenin's precepts unswervingly. It raises executive personnel and all communists in the spirit of high responsibility for the entrusted assignment and the strictest observance of party and state discipline. The leaders' understanding of their high responsibility is displayed primarily in the implementation of the policy of the party and its decisions and in insuring the fulfillment of state plans and the utmost increase in production efficiency and work quality. From each instance of plan nonfulfillment the politically mature leader draws the necessary conclusions, takes all the steps within his power, mobilizes and organizes people, increases the demands made of them and himself and obligatorily strives for success and secures statewide interests.

Practice shows that the overwhelming majority of our personnel adopts an attitude of high responsibility to the entrusted assignment and is exerting the maximum effort, energy and knowledge to accomplish the tasks confronting it. At the same time leaders are still encountered who fail to display initiative, are tolerant of shortcomings and are reconciled to lagging in the sectors which they head. There are also those whose activeness is of an ostentatious nature and is calculated for outward effect. Our party and its Central Committee are striving persistently for the organic combination of collectiveness with personal responsibility in the work of the executive personnel of all levels. "We must increase the demands made of ministers and leaders of sectors, particularly where urgent problems are still being solved too slowly," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech at the CPSU Central Committee November (1978) Plenum. "The Politburo has deemed it necessary for the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and USSR Council of Ministers and their departments and party and soviet authorities locally to intensify supervision of the progress of fulfillment of adopted decisions and raise sharply and in good time questions of the personal responsibility of those who are failing to secure their fulfillment."³⁴

The principle of collectiveness in work requires party committee members to correct those leaders who are in error in good time and teach them to listen to observations in party fashion, react to criticism correctly and adopt measures to rectify shortcomings. An ability to operate collectively and a willingness to submit to the will of the majority are an indicator of a communist's political maturity.

Open, high-minded discussion of workers' blunders is of inestimable significance for the correct training of personnel. V.I. Lenin insistently counseled against concealing and hiding from the masses politicians' mistakes and defeats and urged that they be submitted for the common judgment of politically mature workers. "This might seem awkward at first sight and must sometimes seem 'offensive' to this individual leader or the other," he wrote, "but we are obliged to overcome this false feeling of awkwardness; this is our duty to the party and the working class..."³⁵

High organization, executive efficiency and a critical evaluation of the results that have been achieved are particularly important under current conditions, when the dimensions of communist building have increased immeasurably and its tasks have become more complex. "If today we are striving for high...organization and wish to strengthen discipline at all levels..." Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasizes, "an interested, intent and critical view of the state of affairs is essential to us. It will help us secure the social-political climate necessary for this. A climate which will engender an endeavor to work more efficiently and productively and better.... Whoever ceases to heed criticism is lost for the cause."³⁶

The CPSU invariably abides by Lenin's counsel and instructions. It constantly analyzes its own activity and boldly and decisively reveals and rectifies errors and shortcomings. The practice of critical observations and proposals being discussed regularly at committee sessions and of the communists being notified of the course of their implementation has evolved in the party organizations.

Lenin's principles of the collective nature of leadership are implemented more fully when the party authorities consult with the aktiv and well-informed people on fundamental questions of work and develop the creative initiative of all the communists in the solution of economic-political problems. However capable this leader or the other may be and however much effort he may have put into the job, he will not achieve any real, lasting success without the support of the collective and without the participation of the party aktiv and the broad working people's masses in the implementation of the planned measures.

There was a considerable extension and intensification of intraparty democracy and Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership became even more firmly established following the 25th CPSU Congress. The executive party bodies currently consist of more than 4.6 million people. Practically one out of every four communists has been elected to them.³⁷

The party aktiv plays a big part in the life of the party. It expresses public opinion and organizes the implementation of decisions and directives. Taking this into consideration the party committees regularly convene meetings of the aktiv to discuss the most important CPSU decisions and formulate measures for their implementation and also to examine questions of local life. The times for aktiv meetings are not determined by the party Rules. They are convened by decision of the party committee when necessary.

The participants in the aktiv meeting are not elected and are not delegated. They are usually invited by the party committee with regard for the questions to be discussed. Despite all their importance, the aktiv meetings are of a consultative nature, and their decisions are of a recommendatory nature. But when these decisions are approved at a bureau meeting or in the party committee, they become obligatory for all communists of the given party organization. Regularly consulting with the aktiv, relying on its experience, authority and knowledge and checking the correctness of its actions by it is an indispensable condition of the party committee's successful work.

The consistent and unswerving implementation of Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership is a most important condition of an increase in the creative activeness of the party masses and an improvement in the leadership of communist building.

Lenin's principle of the collective nature of leadership is a law of the life of all Marxist-Leninist parties. Their rules and other documents emphasize that only collective leadership insures the party's correct development and creates the conditions for its normal activity and the development of the initiative of the local organizations and all communists.

The Marxist-Leninist principle of collectiveness is implemented not only in each party individually but on the scale of the entire communist and workers movement. As necessary, the communist and workers parties hold meetings to discuss urgent problems, exchange experience and determine the general line of the world communist movement as a whole. The collective exchange of opinions and experience contributes to an enrichment of Marxist-Leninist theory and the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The communists and all working people of our country have begun active preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, greeting it with splendid successes in all sectors of communist building. The CPSU's strength and authority consist in the fact that it soberly evaluates the path that has been trodden, critically interprets unsolved problems and mobilizes the party and all working people for the achievement of new, higher boundaries.

"We have accumulated valuable experience of communist building in past years," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev emphasized in the report at the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum. "It is essential that we adopt a solicitous approach

to all that is positive in our work, whether in the city or village. At the same time it is essential that we have a critical view of the omissions and shortcomings which, unfortunately, still exist in the practice of economic management and in party work also."³⁸

The CPSU regards the preparations for its 26th congress as a powerful lever of an upsurge in the political and labor activeness of each CPSU member and all working people.

FOOTNOTES

1. See P.A. Rodionov, "Kollektivnost'--vysshiy printsip partiynogo rukovodstva" [Collectiveness--Highest Principle of Party Leadership], Moscow, 1972; "Lektsii po partiynomu stroitel'stvu" [Lectures on Party Building], inst. 1, 2d Ed., supp., Moscow, 1978, pp 273-290; "Partiynoye stroitel'stvo" [Party Building], Moscow, 1978, pp 199-201; and others.
2. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, pp 524-529.
3. Ibid., vol 21, p 224.
4. See ibid., vol 17, pp 445-460.
5. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 4, p 191.
6. Ibid., vol 7, pp 256-257.
7. Ibid., vol 14, p 252.
8. Ibid., vol 8, pp 96-97.
9. Ibid., vol 40, p 238.
10. See Ibid., vol 45, pp 343-348.
11. "Vospominaniya o Vladimire Il'iche Lenine" [Recollections of Valdimir Il'ich Lenin], pt 2, Moscow, 1957, p 697.
12. "O Lenine" [About Lenin]. Reminiscences of Foreign Contemporaries, 2d Ed., Moscow, 1966, pp 50-51.
13. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 38, p 75.
14. Ibid., vol 4, p 375.
15. Ibid., vol 14, p 226.
16. "CPSU Rules," Moscow, 1968, p 52.

17. See "The CPSU in Congress Resolutions and Decisions and Central Committee Conferences and Plenums," vol 9, Moscow, 1972, p 30.
18. "Material of the 23d CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1966, p 196.
19. L.I. Brezhnev, "Tselina" [Virgin Land], Moscow, 1978, p 21.
20. "Takim byl Lenin" [Such Was Lenin], Moscow, 1965, p 61.
22. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 40, p 142.
23. See "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, pp 62, 103.
24. See "25th CPSU Congress," Stenographic report, vol 1, Moscow, 1976, pp 171, 200, 233, 280 and others.
25. Ibid., p 193.
26. PRAVDA 24 June 1980.
27. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 41, pp 30-31.
28. Ibid., p 209.
29. See "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 66.
30. Ibid.
31. See ibid., p 67.
32. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 39, p 45.
33. Ibid., p 46.
34. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 27 November 1978. CPSU Central Committee Plenum Decree," Moscow, 1978, pp 15-16.
35. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 8, pp 96-97.
36. L. I. Brezhnev, "Vozrozhdeniye" [Recovery], Moscow, 1978, p 54.
37. See PRAVDA 24 May 1980.
38. PRAVDA 24 June 1980.

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CSO: 1800

NON-RUSSIAN WORKERS CONSTRUCT BAM CITIES, SETTLEMENTS

Moscow GUDOK in Russian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview between Correspondent A. Skorobogatov and Yuriy Sergeyevich Sushkov, head of the Department of Building and Architectural Affairs, Gosstroy RSFSR: "BAM: Towns and Settlements Are Growing"]

[Text] Before us is a diagram of the Baykal-Amur Mainline. The winding ribbon of its route is color-coded with small white and red circles. The red ones are larger. There are particularly many of them beyond Lake Baykal, and further on to the east, where the Little BAM line takes off to the north from Tynda.

[Question] What do these colors mean?

[Answer] Stations at which taiga settlements and towns are growing are designated by red ones--answered the Head of the Department of Building and Architectural Affairs, Gosstroy RSFSR Yuriy Sergeyevich Sushkov. There will be about 60 of them in all. For now some of them exist in design sketches, while others have already begun to take shape. Residential, service and public buildings are being erected with the assistance of project and building organizations from all 15 union republics of the motherland, and from the 30 autonomous republics, krays and oblasts as well. For example, on just the sector of BAM in Irkutskaya Oblast, chiefs from Krasnodarskiy and Stavropol'skiy Krays are erecting a railroad settlement at the Lena station. Envoys from Armenia are working in Tayura, in Niya [spelling unverified], housing and service-technical buildings are being created from a plan by Georgian architects. In Kiringa [spelling unverified], the same problem is being solved by architects from the Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR and "Rostovgrazhdanproyekt," in Ul'kan, from the Azerbaidzhanskaya SSR, in Kunerma, from North Osetiya, Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetiya. Builders from Gor'kovskaya, Sverdlovskaya and Moskovskaya Oblasts are developing Central Sector settlements at the stations of Mogot, Kuvykta, Khorogochi and Dipkun. A monument to the hero of the Civil War in the Far East, the legendary

Sergey Lazo, has already been put up in the station square in the settlement of Alonka [spelling unverified], which is being built by envoys from Moldaviya.

Muscovite architects and builders are supervising Tynda, the capital of the BAM. They are transforming this previously obscure place into a modern city with a population of many thousands. The buildings here are a match for those in Moscow, both in beauty and convenience.

[Question] And what other kinds of cities will spring up on the route of the new trans-Siberian line?

[Answer] It is planned that the city of Neryungri will become the largest population center of this region. Its population will exceed 100,000 persons in the future. In time Severobaykal'sk will achieve city status. Development of copper deposits in the region of the future station of Chara will be the start of construction on the city of Udakan. It is possible that the settlement near the station of Taksimo will become a city of 25,000.

[Question] Knowledge of each population center situated on a railroad line usually begins with the terminal. What kind will they be on the BAM?

[Answer] We still have to build 58 passenger buildings on the route. It was decided to erect 10 of these, for Tynda, Severobaykal'sk, Urgal and other major junction points based on individual projects, and the rest based on projects drawn up on the basis of standard ones. The largest terminal on the route will spring up in Tynda. A monumental building has been designed by architects from Architecture Shop No 8 of "Mosproyekt-1." Two pylons similar to towers, reaching a height of 40 metres will embellish it from the track side. Accommodations for the dispatcher point will be built between the two pylons, from whence control of the electrical interlocking of switching and signal devices is to be organized. There are to be two passenger halls in the central part of the building under a single roof. The first, a waiting room, is laid out as an amphitheatre over an operations room. A cafe, rooms for mothers with children, a hotel for passengers in transit and shops for personal services [Russian--atel'ye sluzhby byta] will be opened in adjacent rooms.

As for the terminals at the stations on the line, they will be relatively small two-story buildings. Twenty-seven of them are designed for 50 passengers, and the rest for 25. The ground floor is for passengers: electrical interlocking posts, automatic telephone stations and other technical accommodations will occupy the second.

In order to insure architectural unity of the passenger buildings, it is planned to use decorative details when finishing the façades. The walls will be decorated with national ornaments as well as monumental art works.

[Question] What kind of conveniences will there be for the settlement residents?

[Answer] The project for the settlement of Fed'kin Klyuch, which has been approved by Gosstroy RSFSR, may serve as an example. By recommendation of architects from "Mosgiprotrans" [Moscow State Planning and Survey Institute of the RSFSR Ministry of Transport Construction], its central part will be developed with panel-type two-story buildings. Small plots of ground will be set aside next to them for growing vegetables in enclosed ground. Outdoor structures for domestic livestock and fowl are specified. It has been planned to develop a part of the settlement with farm-type houses: wooden cottages with apartments on two levels. A school, a stadium and zones for mass recreation will be opened in the settlement.

9194

CSO: 1829

REGIONAL

ROUNDTABLE ON GEORGIAN, ARMENIAN, AZERBAIJAN CULTURES

Baku **ADABIYYAT VA INJISANAT** in Azeri 11 Jul 80 pp 4-5

[Article reporting on a "roundtable" discussion on the interrelationship of the cultures of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan: "The Friendship of Peoples Is the Friendship of Literatures"]

[Summary] The participants--editors, writers, poets, translators and journalists--met in the city of Gazakh for a conference sponsored jointly by the literary magazines **ADABIYYAT VA INJISANAT** (Azerbaijan); **GRAKAN TERT** (Armenia), **LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO** (Georgia) and the Gazakh raykom of the CPAz. The roundtable was opened by N. Huseynzade, poet and chief editor of **ADABIYYAT VA INJISANAT**. Other keynote speakers were H. Aliyev, first secretary of the CPAz Central Committee; E. Shvardnadze, first secretary of the CPGe Central Committee; and K. Demirchyan, first secretary of the CPAr Central Committee. All opening speeches noted the strengthening of the ancient ties of friendship between the countries of the Caucasus, especially since the years of Soviet rule.

Specific themes and ideas on the actuality of the problems discussed, concerns for the objective development of life and literature, and the relationship of these to the ideological-educational work of the party were raised by participants in the concrete environment of the roundtable itself. Participating in this were: Akram Guliyev, first secretary of Gazakh rayon; Rajia Hovanesyan, chief editor of **GRAKAN TERT**; Vakhtang Chelidze, chief editor of **LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO**; the poetess and Azeri-Georgian translator Leyla Eradze; cultural workers and Georgian literature specialist Dilara Aliyeva; the writer and section director of **GRAKAN TERT**, Grigor Janikyan; the writer-translator and secretary of the primary party organization of the Azerbaijan Writers Union Sayavush Mammadzade; Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Section Director of the Nizami Institute of Literature Mirali Seyidov and the poet-translator Ali Vakil.

The meeting opened stressing the resolution of the nationality problem through the October Revolution; concomitantly, noted A. Guliyev, Soviet power and influence are strongly related to friendship among peoples. The ancient cultural relationship among Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia exemplify this. Noting that these ties should be increased even further to

strengthen the process of internationalism. V. Chelidze said this process "begins with friendship with our close and ancient neighbors." S. Mammadzadeh added that "over the centuries this friendship... has created a regional culture of the peoples of the Transcaucasus. There are common roots in our music, poetry, applied art and folklore. Because of the regional cultural system of the Transcaucasus we have entered into the cultural process of the world as separate cultures."

M. Seyidov noted the many common strains in the epic literature of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as mythology and philosophy; G. Janikyan mentioned that working songs, lullabies and riddles are part of these common elements. The common elements shared by the Armenian epic "David Sasun" and the Azeri epic "Koroghlu," who sacrificed his life for the freedom and independence of his people, were noted by R. Hovanesyan and S. Mammadzadeh. Hovanesyan cited several Armenian bards who wrote Azeri poetry in the 18th century. Seyidov stressed the necessity of investigating the connections between the Armenian and Azeri languages, especially as they have developed in the Soviet period.

A. Vkhil cited an example of the interrelationship of the cross-fertilization of Armenian and Azeri literature through the literary periodical GRAKAN AZERBAIJAN, which is published in Armenia in Azerbaijan, and pointed out that it was the first Armenian literary journal published in the Soviet Union, as it predates the founding of SOVETAKAN GRAKANUTYUN (1934) by 2 years. Hovanesyan noted that the Armenian press and magazines "very often print examples of literature from fraternal Azeri and Georgian literature."

A major barrier in communication between the three peoples is translation. Aliyeva said that "to perform a good translation one must know the original language perfectly, and in order to get the feel of the language one should live in an environment where it is actually spoken"; she cited the experience of the Baltic republics which "assign talented writers to other republics and countries so that they can learn the living language, the entire culture and history of the people, and study the past literature." She added that, in another aspect of translation activities, Georgia is well set up due to the creation of a translation committee and a translation journal oriented towards the theory of translation. She regretted that such a journal did not exist in Azerbaijan. Eradze suggested that critics have been neglecting their work when it comes to translations; Aliyeva, Mammadzadeh, Chelidze and Hovanesyan all agreed with her.

On Azeri-Georgian literary connections Aliyeva noted that the problem is connected to the entire question of the Transcaucasian renaissance, and mentioned Nizami's concern with Georgian literature, especially in Shota Rustaveli; she was backed up in this by Seyidov, Mammadzadeh and Vkhil, who quoted a passage from Nizami on Armenia.

Chelidze noted that "cultural relations of the Transcaucasian peoples began anew in the 19th century and entered into a new stage in the environment

of Tiflis due to the synergical effect of the Russian intelligentsia, especially the Decembrists who were there at that time. Their influence on M. F. Akhundov in Azerbaijan, Kh. Abovyan in Armenia and A. Chavchavadze in Georgia "gave a strong stimulus to the democratic education movement."

Summing up, the participants said that the "idea of unity of the peoples of our area found its reflection on a high intellectual-esthetic level" (Guliyev), that translator cadres have to be better organized (Hovanesyan and Chelidze), that scholarly exchange of the student level should be stepped up between the three republics (Mammadzadeh) and that the entire roundtable discussion was useful (Guliyev).

9676

CSO: 1810

REGIONAL

BURGEONING TAJIK POPULATION NEEDS NEW CITIES

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TAJIKISTANA in Russian 3 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by I. Yurov, architect: "City on the Hills: Putting City-Building on a Scientific Basis"]

[Text] The growth of our republic's cities and settlements, a growth that has been influenced by the development of productive forces and by the increase in the size of the population, invariably removed from agricultural circulation valuable agricultural land. And there is not so much of that to begin with -- the arable land in Tajikistana occupies 5.3 percent of the 7 percent of valley land (93 percent of the territory, as everyone knows, is mountains).

Whereas in 1940 the amount of arable land per person in the republic was 0.53 hectares and in 1959, 0.38 hectares, at the present time it is only 0.20 hectares. This is only one-fourth of the figure for the country as a whole. How, then, is one to avoid the reduction of the republic's land resources?

A problem that requires attention is the problem of the efficient use of the land during city-building. The loss of every hectare of land that is allocated for the purpose of being built up is irreversible and irreplaceable. Computations indicate that, if we carry out housing construction in the way we are doing it now, within the next decade that will require one-fourth of all the irrigated land existing in the republic. It is easy to imagine the situation we shall be in by the year 2000 if radical steps are not taken.

The ways to preserve the valuable agricultural land in our republic are the following: the intensive use of the complex relief for housing and civic construction; the increase in the density of city planning in cities and settlements by increasing the number of stories in the buildings; and the use of underground space on a broad scale.

The complicated relief of the terrain, the extreme limitation of the territory for construction, the high seismicity, the weak (sedimentary)

soils that are typical of most of the parts of Tajikistan, are factors that influence the need for an efficient, scientifically substantiated use of the land.

In this regard, critical tasks confront architectural-construction and city-building science. It is necessary right now to carry out on an urgent basis thoroughgoing scientific research and experiments, and, on their basis, to develop new methods of planning and building up cities and settlements.

We have already made the first attempts to engage thoroughly in the assimilation of the hilly territories of the eastern part of Dushanbe for experimental designing and construction. The city-builders of the Tajikgiprostroy GPI [state planning institute] have prepared the first sketches for the planning of the eastern housing area, and the scientists from a number of NII [scientific research institutes] have prepared the first version of the Instruction Manual for the Assimilation of the Hilly Territories of the Eastern Part of the City of Dushanbe for Experimental Designing and Construction.

It is necessary, however, to say that its scientific substantiation can be ascertained only in the process of experimental designing and construction on the hilly territory of the capital.

In our opinion, it would be desirable for the authors of the instruction manual, as well as the scientists at the Institute of Earthquake-Resistant Construction and Seismology, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, to take direct part in developing an experimental scheme for the planning and building up of the eastern housing area of Dushanbe. Only after the comprehensive experiment and the obtaining of scientifically substantiated data, will there appear any real opportunity to prepare an instruction manual for the use of the complex relief of Tajikistan for mass construction.

At the present time, scientific forecasts for the development of city-building are of great importance. As has been shown by practical life, their absence has a detrimental effect upon the preparation of schemes for regional planning and resettlement of the rural population. The schemes that are prepared without a scientific basis, obviously, do not have and cannot have any well-substantiated recommendations for the use of mountain slopes, the complex relief, underground space, or increased density of city buildup for purposes of preserving the valley land intended for agricultural use. Actually, they contain the long-range size of the population of the cities and rural populated points, but no determination of their territorial development. Therefore the process of using for construction purposes the valuable agricultural land in the republic is becoming uncontrollable.

An important reserve for reducing the need for new territories for urban development, as is well known, is the sharp increase in the number of stories, both of housing and of production buildings. However, in cities in Tajikistan, the percentage of buildings with an increased number of

stories is extremely low. In the Dushanbe general plan that was approved in 1965, provision was made for the construction of 30 percent of the apartment buildings with an increased number of stories. The city long ago reached the rated size of the population, but the number of apartment buildings with an increased number of stories which have been built is only about a dozen.

In order to keep the valuable irrigated land intact, it is important to achieve a sharp increase in the density of urban development, and to raise to the intelligent limits the number of stories in buildings in all cities and settlements. USSR Gosstroy should reconsider its decision that deals with the limitation of the construction of buildings with an increased number of stories in seismic areas. From the point of view of the efficient use of the land, it would be advisable to take a course of reinforcing the structures, rather than reducing the number of stories.

The economical and intensive use of the urban land is also influenced by underground urbanization. In the cities of Tajikistan, it would be desirable to place under the ground not only the engineer-transport institutions, but also the numerous trade, entertainment, communal-and-everyday-service, and other institutions that are designed for short-term use by the public. It is possible to have underground industrial construction of production entities that require the creation of hermetically sealed areas, an artificial climate, and special production conditions with highly-developed automation of production processes.

Under the conditions of Tajikistan, with the extremely limited land resources, questions that take on importance to the national economy are those dealing with the development of a scientifically substantiated economic evaluation of the arable land.

At the present time, compensation for appropriated irrigated land to the kolkhozes and sovkhoses in the republics of Central Asia is not identical. For example, in Tajik SSR that compensation constitutes 10,800 rubles per hectare; in Uzbek SSR, 5,300 rubles per hectare. The development of the economic evaluation of arable land will make it possible to substantiate the use of the complex relief for the purpose of construction, to increase the density and number of studies in the building up of the cities and populated places, and to determine the scope of remodeling of the inefficient city buildup with nomadic tents and buildings with a small number of stories, as well as the desirability of underground construction in the republic. In a word, the economic evaluation of the arable land, an evaluation drawn up on the basis of the value of cotton on the nationwide scale and the limited nature of the irrigated land, would make it possible to influence the preservation of the irrigated land.

With a consideration of the importance of retaining the valuable irrigated land, the time has apparently come to create, under the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, a scientific-research center for urban development and for the efficient use of the land. That center should be the place

for concentrating the management and coordination of the scientific-research projects involving urban development and the preservation of the land resources, and those involving the developing of the general scheme for the use of the land resources of Tajikistan. When developing the general scheme for the use of the land resources for the long-term period, it is necessary to define precisely the permanently exempt areas of arable land and the specific reserve territories for urban development. The scheme must provide for the scientifically substantiated comprehensive territorial organization of production and settlement.

It would apparently be desirable to create in the republic a responsible state agency for the protection and efficient use of the land. Its creation will make it possible within the next few years to develop effective methods for controlling the process of expending the land for construction purposes, to increase the responsibility borne by all the ministries and departments for the correct use of agricultural land, to preclude the departmental approach, and, in the final analysis, to preserve the land resources for the present generation and for future ones.

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CSO: 1800

REGIONAL

TURKMEN SSR FACED WITH ENCROACHING SAND DUNES

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by V. Sorkin, Turkmenskaya SSR: "How Does One Pacify the Sand Dunes?: Spot Report"]

[Text] From the crest of a sand dune many meters high, sand streams down like a gray snake, covering the fertile land. Steep waves of sand, like waves in some science-fiction sea, keep encroaching slowly and implacably upon the flourishing oasis. And there is no salvation from them. The rivers dry up, the irrigation canals collapse, the white-hot breathing of the dry winds kills the orchards and fields. That is how the ancient civilizations in the heart of the great Central Asian desert -- the Karakumy (Black Desert) -- died.

The fight against the shifting sands continues to remain on the agenda. Geologists and geophysicists, and construction workers, are working in the desert, electrical-transmission lines, roads, and industrial enterprises are being built, and hundreds of thousands of hectares of virgin land are being put into agricultural circulation. The Karakumy are being inhabited and are being assimilated -- that is a fact. A fact which undoubtedly is a positive one. But it also has its costs. Powerful modern machines -- powerful trucks, bulldozers, and excavators -- burrow through the sand dunes, destroying the vegetative cover. The restoration of that cover by the natural method, as in the tundra, takes many years. Before that happens, the implacable laws of nature go into effect. Wind erosion and winter storms complete what was begun, and a sand giant begins moving. . .

Fifty years ago, on the right bank of the Amudar'ya River, the Farabskaya Forest-Reclamation Expedition was created. The work carried out by the participants in that expedition in the middle course of the river made it possible to protect reliably the fertile valley with the aid of the perennial bush, tamarisk. However, the traditional methods of reinforcing the sand dunes are no longer satisfactory, when judged either according to their rate of speed or according to their quality.

Therefore, not too long ago, in the zone of the Farab-Kuydzhik irrigation collector, which was being threatened by the shifting sand, experimental operations were begun. The experiment was supposed to provide the answer to the question of how effective the new technology of the sand-reinforcing operations is. That technology was proposed by Senior Scientific Colleague of the Institute of Deserts, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, I. Svintsov and by the director of the Chardzhou Timber Farm, M. Movchan.

It had already been established previously that the most effective means of reinforcing the sands are *nerosin*, fuel oil, and petroleum. However, after several years the layer of viscous substances begins to break down. What should one do?

It was then that the specialists proposed carrying out, first of all, fencing-and-reclamation operations, the planting of vegetation to reinforce the sand -- saltwort and buckwheat -- and only then to spread the viscous substances. The protective covering retains its properties for about three years -- that is a length of time that is completely sufficient for the saltwort and buckwheat to set their roots and reinforce the upper layer of the sand dune.

The experiment on the Farab-Kuydzhik Canal, in the course of which it proved successful to protect the bed of the canal from the onslaught of the sand dune, convincingly demonstrated the advantages of the new method.

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REGIONAL

ADVANCED COURSES FOR RAYON RUSSIAN TEACHERS

Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 8 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Shahid Āzimov: "For Teachers of Russian"]

[Text] In order to increase specialists in the teaching of Russian language and literature working in the national schools in our Republic the Azerbaijan Graduate Teachers Institute has taken a number of measures. Of the different ways to increase the number of specialists there are: seminars on problems, goals and pedagogy, and the organization of extension and monthly courses.

In the current year 350 Russian language and literature teachers heightened their expertise in extension courses set up in Masally, Aghsu, Gutgashen, Guba and in other rayons. In a number of rayons pedagogical seminars and zonal scientific conferences were held.

One hundred and fifty Russian language and literature teachers from the rayons of Daghlygh Garabagh were sent to the advanced monthly course in the city of Shusha. The tasks of the course were well organized.

Prominent teachers and methodologists lecture in the courses. In their free time students take part in various group cultural activities and see the historical monuments of Shusha and other famous places.

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REGIONAL

BOOK DISCUSSES POPULATION, DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY

Alma-Ata NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZAKHSTANA in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 76-77

[Review by S. Sundetov, chief of Department of Economics of Labor and Labor Resources of NIEIPiN with Gosplan, Kazakh SSR, candidate of economic sciences of the book "Razvitiye narodonaseleniya i demograficheskaya politika" by M. Tatimov]

[Text] Nauka Publishing House of the Kazakh SSR has published a book by M. Tatimov entitled, "Razvitiye narodonaseleniya i demograficheskaya politika" [The Development of Population and Demographic Policy]. The author of the monograph analyzes the basic socio-philosophical aspects of a systems study of demographic development and thrusts to the foreground the problem of efficient use of labor resources and questions of elaborating an effective long-term demographic policy. In this regard, special attention is devoted to the specific problems of Kazakhstan.

The first chapter deals with the methodological bases for social control of population development. The author investigates the possibilities for purposeful influence on various forms of natural and mechanical population movement and confirms the necessity for social influence on the demographic situation.

Using Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics as an example, the work proves convincingly that socialism possesses a tremendous advantage over capitalism in the solution of population problems. M. Tatimov subjects Malthusianism to convincing and well-founded criticism from Marxist positions and he proves the groundlessness of its reactionary conclusions.

The second chapter discloses the effectiveness of a socialist society's demographic policy as a tool for influencing population processes. Analyzing the demographic situation in light of this policy, the author finds the correct paths for the solution of a number of difficult methodological problems. He considers the population of the republics or economic rayons as a single demographic organism rather than a closed system.

In the third chapter, great attention is devoted to the historical process of population development in our country under the influence of the radical economic and socio-political changes.

The work expresses the thought of the possible further growth of the population as a whole throughout the country. According to the researcher's assumption, it will number approximately 300 million people by the year 2000.

Treatment of problems of the dynamics in numbers of the various nationalities living in the USSR and the growth in the city population by national composition which is examined in a rather broad plane--for 75 years--is of certain interest.

The reproduction regime's phased evolution is analyzed using Kazakhstan as an example, and the thought that in the contemporary demographic situation the republic has its own regional special features is substantiated.

The high rates in population growth up to the second half of the 1960's were caused, as the author correctly notes, by the wide-scale development of the region's natural resources.

Thousands of workers and specialists came to Kazakhstan from various regions of the country, and it became one of the most multinational union republics.

Thanks to the relatively low death rate and high birth rate, the natural population increase in the republic is three times greater than the average for the country. Nevertheless, the natural demographic base of Kazakhstan is still insufficient for its further rapid economic development. Therefore, the republic is interested in a higher natural increase in labor resources.

In evaluating the work's trend favorably, it should be noted that not all the questions which are touched upon in it are elaborated with the same depth and individual aspects of the subject did not receive sufficient treatment.

In the author's opinion, some mitigation of the shortage in labor resources is attained through the rational direction of the population's migration in the country (p 77). However, he does not point to the difficulties connected with the solution of this problem. A population surplus in some economic rayons is not directed so easily to other rayons to provide a labor force for the national economy. Problems in the rationalization of migration processes and the distribution and redistribution of worker personnel touch on a complex of economic, social, and moral factors, primarily problems in the optimum disposition of production.

Great interest is aroused among the book's readers by the definition of the basic principles for a single and regional population policy in a Soviet society, the correctness of which is subject to no doubt and question. However, there should have been a deeper disclosure of the debatable nature of the so-called "differentiated" policy. Despite the fact that the work is based on a

serious foundation of statistical analysis, more materials on the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan should have been drawn upon. There is a special requirement for a deeper analysis of demographic history and the status and prospects of our republic in this regard.

However, on the whole the book is a necessary and useful investigation. It is attracting the attention of scientific and planning personnel who are occupied with problems in the disposition and forecasting of labor resources.

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